The problem of Searle

dc.contributor.author	Ляшенко, Д. Н.	ru
dc.contributor.author	Ляшенко, Д. М.	uk
dc.contributor.author	Lyashenko, D.	en
dc.date.accessioned	2022-07-04T10:00:16Z
dc.date.available	2022-07-04T10:00:16Z
dc.date.issued	2022-05
dc.identifier.citation	Lyashenko D. The problem of Searle // Х Уйомовські читання (2022): матеріали Наукових читань пам’яті Авеніра Уйомова. – Одеса: ОНУ ім. І.І. Мечнікова, 2022. – С. 31-37.	uk_UA
dc.identifier.uri	https://repo.odmu.edu.ua:443/xmlui/handle/123456789/11414
dc.description.abstract	When Searle entered the field of philosophy of mind in the early 1980s, the question immediately arose, who is Mr. Searle? And the answer came – he is, of course, a property dualist. Later, Searle even wrote an article “Why I am not a property dualist”. But nevertheless…	uk_UA
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher
dc.subject	John Searle	en
dc.subject	property dualism	en
dc.subject	the mind-body problem	en
dc.subject	Inconsistent tetrad	en
dc.subject	Tsofnas Arnold	en
dc.subject	types of ontological questions	en
dc.subject	structural ontology	en
dc.subject	dynamic ontology	en
dc.subject	natural ontology	en
dc.subject	George Lakoff	en
dc.title	The problem of Searle	en
dc.type	Article	en